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Lansing and Peters: Bowen v. United States Postal Service: The Duty of Fair Represent

BO WEN V. UNITED STA TES POSTAL SER VICE:
THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
BECOMES A BURDEN
PaulLansing *
Brian W. Peters**
INTRODUCTION

On January 11, 1983 a sharply divided Supreme Court' significantly
broadened labor unions' liability for the injuries of members improperly
2
discharged by their employers. Bowen v. United States PostalService
stands for the proposition that a union that has violated its duty of fair
representation is responsible for the increase in an employee's backpay
award caused by the breach. 3 Thus, a grievance arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining contract limits the employer's liability for improper
discharge to the backpay which would have accrued at a hypothetical
arbitration date. Further, the Court, in effect, placed the union in a
position akin to that of a guarantor by charging the union with all
remaining backpay liability. 4 In a typical case, the union's role as guarantor will leave it liable for greater damages than the employer.
The decision in Bowen clearly conflicts with the purposes of national
labor policy and the role of unions in that policy. Further, it is a predictable, if not logical, result of the Supreme Court's confusion of union and
management causes of action in earlier cases. This article will examine the
5
purposes of the present national labor policy and the union's role therein,
note the subsequent confusion of suits against unions and suits against
• Associate Professor, College of Business Administration, University of Iowa; B.A., City University of New York, 1968; J.D., University of Illinois, 1971; Diploma, International Legal Studies,
Stockholm University, 1973.
•* B.A., Iowa State University, 1981; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 1984.
I. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
and joined in part by Justice Rehnquist, concurred in part in the judgment and dissented in part,
expressing the view that the employer should be primarily liable for the entire amount of the
employee's backpay. Justice Rehnquist dissented as to the Court's assertion that Bowen should
not have been deprived of the full amount of his compensatory damages because he failed to
cross-appeal. Bowen v. United States Postal Service, _U.S.-,
103 S.Ct. 588 (1983).
2. 103 S.Ct. 588.
3. ld. at 595.

4. See id.
5.

See infra notes 9-34 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

1

Hofstra Labor
Employment
Iss. 12:1[1984], Art. 5
Hofstraand
Labor
Law Journal Law Journal, Vol. 2, [Vol.

employers 6 and analyze the Court's decision in Bowen and its likely

consequences. 7 Finally, some suggestions for limiting union liability in
8
future cases will be offered.

NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND THE UNION'S ROLE THEREIN

A fundamental theme of federal labor law is the preservation of

labor peace. 9 Congress chose to effectuate this goal by encouraging and
6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100-204 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 205-31 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., the statements of congressional intent contained in the following federal statutes:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by
some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other
forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the
instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially
affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed
goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in
commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of
commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the
flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between
industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption,
and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
National Labor Relations Act §1, 29 U.S.C. §151 (1976).
Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and with the full
production of articles and commodities for commerce, can be avoided or substantially
minimized if employers, employees, and labor organizations each recognize under law one
another's legitimate rights in their relations with each other, and above all recognize under
law that neither party has any right in its relations with any other to engage in acts or
practices which jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest.
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their
relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the
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protecting the formation of labor unions.1 0 Unions were given the sole
authority to negotiate wages, hours, and conditions of employment" in
the belief that mandated negotiation with a single representative would
2
lead to more peaceful and efficient resolution of disputes.'
Two points should be noted about the status of unions in federal
labor policy. First, Congress determined that unions required significant

federal protection in order to achieve a level of unionization which, Congress believed, would preserve labor peace. This protection assumed var-

ious forms, such as the exemption of unions from antitrust actions under

interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of
individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect
commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which
affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the
public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §1(b), 29 U.S.C. §141(b)(1976).
10. Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of
ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain
acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to
decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following definitions
of and limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States are
enacted.
Norris-LaGuardia Act §2, 29 U.S.C. §102 (1976). See also statutes cited supra note 9.
II. For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, andother terms and
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party...
National Labor Relations Act §8(d), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1976) (emphasis added).
12. As Getman and Blackburn note regarding the National Labor Relations Act:
The focus of the statute was on eliminating barriers to organization and collective
bargaining. Unlike labor laws in other nations, the Wagner Act did not seek to regulate the
relationship of the parties once recognition was achieved and good faith bargaining begun.
This reflects the central role which attempts to combat union organization and refusals to
recognize played in the major labor management conflicts of the preceding half century. It
also reflects the relatively positive experience with collective bargaining once undertaken.
Neither union nor management desired governmental involvement in setting wages and
working conditions.
J. GFIMAN AND J. BLACKBURN. LABOR RELATIONS: LAW. PRACTICE AND POLICY 29-30 (1983).
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14
the Sherman Act,' 3 the corporate-like limited liability granted to unions,
the representation of all workers in a bargaining unit upon approval by a
majority of those workers, 15 and the requirement that the employer bargain fairly with the union once the union is certified.' 6 Second, Congress
assigned to unions the singular role of negotiating wages, hours, and

conditions of employment. 7 Unions derive their exclusive control of grievance procedures from the collective bargaining agreement, not from the
18
operation of federal statutes.
Numerous union rights and duties have also been implied by the
statutory language of the labor acts; among the most important of these is
the union's duty to fairly represent all persons in the bargaining unit. The
union's duty of fair representation was first imposed in Steele v. Louisville

& Nashville Railroad'9 under the Railway Labor Act. 20 In Steele, the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (the Brotherhood)
negotiated a contract with the Railroad calculated to ultimately exclude
all black firemen from employment with the railroad, in favor of white
union members. 2' Bester William Steele, a black fireman, was represented
13. 15 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (1976). This exemption was first attempted under §20 of the Clayton
Act, see H.R. Doc. No. 669, 72d Cong., Ist
Sess. 3 (1932), but §20 proved an ineffective exemption as
construed and applied by the Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921) and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927). Congress
subsequently enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§101- 115 (1970),
sections 5,4 and 13 of which were held by the Supreme Court in Milk Wagon Drivers'Union v. Lake
Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) and United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U,S. 219 (1941) to
exempt unions from antitrust actions under the Sherman Act.
14. "Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States
shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be
enforceable against any individual member or his assets." Labor Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act §301(b), 29 U.S.C. §185(b) (1976).
15. "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees ... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees ...
National Labor Relations Act §9(a), 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
16. 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1976) quoted supra,note 11.
17. National Labor Relations Act §§8(d), 9(a); 29 U.S.C. §§158 (d), 159(a) (1976); see also
Lehmann, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation-Steeleand Its Successors, 30 FED. B.J. 280,
280(1971).
18. Representatives designated ,. shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees... Provided,that any individual employee or group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms Of the collective bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect: Providedfurther,that the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
National Labor Relations Act §9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) (emphasis in original); B. TAYLOR & F.
WITNEY. LABOR RELATIONs LAW 367-68 (1971).
19. 323 U.S. 192(1944).
20. 45U.S.C.§§151-188(1976&Sdpp.V 1981).
21. By established practice on the several railroads .. only white firemen [could] be
promoted to serve as engineers, and [the union] proposed that only "promotable," i.e.,
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by the Brotherhood in contract negotiations, but was excluded from
membership in the Brotherhood because of his race.2 2 As a result of the
contract, Steele was demoted from work on passenger trains to less desirable and less remunerative work, first on freight trains and then on a
switching train.23 In each instance Steele was replaced by a white Brotherhood member with less seniority and no greater qualifications for the
24

job.

The Supreme Court 25 noted that Congress had endowed the union
with quasi-legislative power over Steele and observed that such power is
subject to constitutional limitations on its use and abuse.26 Logically,
then, Congress should have included such limitations in the Railway
Labor Act and spared the Supreme Court a difficult constitutional decision. Since Congress had not done so, the Court probed a somewhat

white, men should be employed as firemen or assigned to new runs or jobs or permanent
vacancies in established runs or jobs.
[The] railroads and the Brotherhood, as representative of the craft, entered into a new
agreement which provided that no more that, 50% of the firemen in each class of service in
each seniority district of a carrier should be negroes; that until such percentage should be
reached all new runs and all vacancies should be filled by white men; and that the
agreement did not sanction the employment of Negroes in any seniority district in which
they were not working.
22. Id. at 194-95
23. Id. at 196.
24. Id.
25. Steele reached the Supreme Court on appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of
Alabama. The action in state court followed an essentially identical action in the federal court system
which both the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals found to lack federal question jurisdiction. Specifically, the courts denied that there had been
sufficient state action to support a Constitutional due process claim under the fifth amendment, and
denied that the plaintiff had such rights under the RLA. Teague v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, 127 F.2d 53, 56 (1942).
In Alabama Circuit Court, the Railroad and the Brotherhood demurred to Steele's amended
complaint and the Circuit Court sustained the demurrer. The Alabama Supreme Court, on appeal,
affirmed. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 245 Ala. 113, 114, 16 So.2d 416, 417 (1944). The
Supreme Court of Alabama found that Steele had no fifth amendment claim in the absence of state
action, and that the Railroad was not guilty of conspiracy in fulfilling its obligation under the RLA to
bargain with the Brotherhood in good faith. 245 Ala. at 117-19, 16 So.2d at 418, 420. Further, the
Court found that seniority rights were not vested, but were subject to the revision or elimination by
the union:
When, by reason of changed economic circumstances, it became apparent that the earlier
agreement should be modified in the general interest of all members of the Brotherhood it
was within the power of the latter to do so, notwithstanding the result thereof to plaintiff.
The Brotherhood had the power by agreement with the Railway to create the seniority
rights of plaintiff, and it likewise by the same method had the power to modify or destroy
these rights in the interest of all the members.
245 Ala. at 118, 16 So.2d at 419, quoting Hartley v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201,206,
277 N.W. 885, 887 (1938).
26. Steele, 323 U.S. at 198-99.
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metaphysical congressional intent and discovered a quite substantial duty
27
of fair representation.
Similarly, Congress had been negligent in its protection of racial
minorities in the.National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 28 and, in Syres v.
Oil Workers InternationalUnion,29 the Supreme Court was again able to
discern a congressional intent to remedy this error. 30 Although the Court
was somewhat vague about the corporal situs of the union's duty under
the NLRA, 31 the National Labor Relations Board in Miranda Fuel
Company32 concluded that the duty lies in section 8(b) of the Act.33 The

27. If, as the state court has held, the Act conferred this power on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees without any commensurate statutory duty towards its
members, constitutional questions arise. For the representative is clothed with power not
unlike that of a legislature, which is subject to constitutional limitation on its power to
deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates, and
which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights. If the
Railway Labor Act purports to impose on petitioner and other Negro members of the craft
the legal duty to comply with the terms of a contract whereby the representative has
discriminatorily restricted their employment for the benefit and advantage of the Brotherhood's own members, we must decide the constitutional questions which petitioner raises in
his pleading.
But we think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and authorizing a
union, chosen by majority of a craft, to represent the craft, did not intend to confer plenary
power upon the union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its members, rights of the minority of
the craft, without imposing on it any duty to protect the minority.
Id. See also Jones, The Origins of the Concept of the Duty of FairRepresentationin THE DuTY OF
FAIR REPRESENTATION 25 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).

28. 29U.S.C.§§151-169(1976).
29. 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
30. Syres was a per curiam decision which read simply:
"The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the
case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323
U.S. 192; Turnstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210; Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768."
Id.
31. Although no statute imposes a duty of fair representation upon unions, we have held
...that 'the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a designated
unit uncludes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or
discrimination toward any, to exercise its discreton with complete good faith and honesty,
and to avoid arbitrary conduct.'
Howen,.._U.S. at......... 103 S.Ct. at 604 n.9, quoting Vaca v.Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (19670. See
also Aaron, The Duty of FairRepresentation:An Overview inTHE DuTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION.
8-9 (J.
McKelvey ed. 1977).
32. 140 N.L.R.B.,51 L.R.R.M.1584(1962), enforcement denied,326 F.2d 172(2d Cir. 1963).
33. [W]e are of the opinion that Section 7 thus gives employees the right to be free from
unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters
affecting their employment. This right of employees is a statutory limitation on statutory
bargaining representatives, and we conclude that Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act aceordingly
prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory representative capacity, from
taking. action against any employee upon considerations or classifications which are
irrelevant, invidious, or unfair.
Miranda, 140 N.L.R.B. at 185,51 L.R.R.M. at 1587 (footnote omitted).
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Court has, of course, subsequently expanded the duty of fair representation to cover far more than racial discrimination. 34
SUITS UNDER SECTION

301

AND THE RULE

OF APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES

The union's duty of fair representation plays an important role in
employee suits for breach of contract by an employer 35 brought under
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).36 When
the collective bargaining agreement contains grievance and arbitration
provisions which are intended as the exclusive remedies for the employer's
breach of contract, 37 an employee is generally barred from bringing suit in
federal court until those remedies have been exhausted. 38 The employee,
however, may proceed with the suit if the employer's conduct amounts to
a repudiation of the grievance and arbitration provisions, 39 or if her union
has the sole power to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure
and wrongfully refuses to process the grievance, 40 thus violating its duty
4
of fair representation. '
The use of "exhaustion of remedies" as a defense in Section 301 suits
has produced considerable blurring of the distinction between actions for
the employer's breach of contract and actions for the union's breach of
the duty of fair representation. The employer's breach of the collective
bargaining agreement is a special form of contract violation which Section 301 allows to be brought in the federal courts. 42 The union's breach

34. See generally Blumrosen, Group Interests in Labor Law, 13 RUTGERs L. REv. 432
(1958-59); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. Rav. 601 (1956); Comment,
Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
35. See, e.g., Tobias, IndividualEmployee Suitsfor Breach of the Labor Agreement and the
Union's Duty of FairRepresentation, 5 U. TOL L. REv. 514 (1974).
36. 29 U.S.C. §185 (1976).
37. Most contracts do, in fact, contain such provisions. Lehmann, The Union's Duty of Fair
Representation- Steele and its Successors, 30 FED. BJ. 280, 282 n. 15. See Collyer Insulated Wire
Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 843 n. 18, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937 n. 17 (1971) (95 percent of all collective
bargaining agreements contain such provisions).
38. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
39. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
40. Id. at 185-86.
41. See Bowen, -at
103 S.Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting).
42. Section 301 provides, in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §301(a), 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1976). The right of
individual employees to bring suit under §301 was established in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 37
U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962). See Bowen, -. U.S. at - , 103 S.Ct. at 600 ('White, J., dissenting).
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of the duty of fair representation is not a violation of contract, 43 but a
violation of federal labor law as interpreted by Steele and its progeny.44
When the employer has breached a collective bargaining agreement containing an exclusive grievance procedure, the injured employee must
effectively plead two causes of action: the employer's breach of contract
and the union's breach of its duty of fair representation. 45 Consistent with
the dual nature of the action, damages should typically be apportioned
between the employer and the union.
Prior to Bowen, the Supreme Court had not directly decided the
issue of damage apportionment in Section 301 suits. The question had,
however, been addressed in dicta in three cases: Vaca v. Sipes,46 Czosek v.
O'Mara,47 and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Foust.48 In Vaca a Missouri jury awarded Benjamin Owens backpay and
punitive damages for his union's failure to bring his claim of an improper
medical dismissal to arbitration. 49 The Supreme Court 50 reversed on two
grounds: first, Owens failed to prove the union breached its duty of fair
representaiton, 51 and second, the union could not be held liable for damages caused by the employer's breach of contract.5 2 Although each of
43. Although the duty of fair representation could, conceivably, be made a part of the
collective bargaining agreement, that incorporation would be largely superfluous unless the duty was
defined more stringently than under the national labor common law.
44. See Bowen, - U.S. at - , 103 S.Ct. at 604 (White, J., dissenting) quoted supranote 31.
45. In fact, these causes of action might be brought as seperate suits. See Tobias,supra note 36,
at 515-16.
46. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
47. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
48. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
49. In Vaca, Benjamin Owens, Jr. was discharged by Swift and Company on the grounds that
high blood pressure and a congenital heart murmur made him unfit for work. Owens protested his
dismissal and the union processed his grievance through the first four stages of the five step grievance
process. Prior to the fifth step of the grievance process, which involved binding arbitration, the union
suggested that Owens have a complete physical examination by the doctor of his choice. Owens chose
Dr. H.W. Day, who reported that Owens was, in his professional opinion, unable to work. The union
thereafter refused to take Owens' grievance to arbitration. Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W. 2d 658, 660-61.

Owens sued the union in state court and received ajury verdict for $7,000 actual and $3,300 punitive
damages. The trial court set aside the judgment on the grounds that jurisdiction over the subject
matter was preempted by the federal government. Id. at 659. Owens appealed to the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, but died while the appeal was pending, id., sustaining Dr. Day's opinion of his
health. Nileds Sipes, as administrator of Owens' estate, was substituted as appellant and received an
affirmation of the trial court from the Court of Appeals. Following the dissent of one judge, however,
the Court of Appeals, of its own motion, transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri. Id.
at 659-60. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to
reinstate the jury verdict. Id. at 666.
50. Justice White wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Brennan, Clark, Douglas, and
Stewart joined. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan joined in a concurring opinion by Justice
Fortas. Justice Black dissented.
51. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 194-95.
52. Id. at 195.
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these grounds was dispositive, the Court added its conception of a fair
apportionment of damages in a proper case:
The governing principle ...

is to apportion liability between the

employer and the union according to the damage caused by the fault
of each. Thus damages attributable solely to the employer's breach of
contract should not be charged to the union, but increases if any in
those damages caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance
53
should not be charged to the employer.
Interestingly, however, the Vaca Court suggested that the union's proper
share of Owens' damages would have been negligible.5 4
In Czosek v. O'Mara,furloughed employees of the Erie Lackawanna
Railroad Company claimed that they had been wrongfully discharged by
the Railroad and that their union had breached its duty of fair representation by its handling of the "wrongful discharge." 55 Both the union and the
Railroad contended that the employees were barred from suing because
they failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under the
Railway Labor Act. 56 In affirming the suit against the union,57 the Court
53. Id. at 197-98.
54. Id. at 198.
55. The facts of the case were as follows:
Prior to 1960 the plaintiffs were employed by the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western
Railroad as stationary engineers in a power plant in Buffalo, New York. In that year the
Delaware merged with the Erie Railroad, with the approval of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, forming the present defendant Erie Lackawanna line. Plaintiffs were continued
in their former positions by the merged line until 1962, when they were furloughed.
The complaint is very grudging in its recitation of the claims upon which federal
jurisdiction is invoked. It is alleged that the 1962 furlough constituted a discharge of
plaintiffs since they were never recalled and were in fact replaced by employees who had
worked for the Erie Railroad before the merger. The complaint then claims that the
discharges were the direct result of the 1960 merger, and violated 'the Interstate Act, 49
U.S.C.A. §5 et seq.' and the 'Implementing Agreement' between the Erie Lackawanna and
its employees represented by defendant unions. A violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., is also alleged in that the Railroad failed to give the required 30 days
written notice of an intended change in working conditions prior to the discharge of the
plaintiffs.
Finally it is alleged that plaintiffs repeatedly requested the defendant unions and their
officials to process their claims against the Railroad, but that these defendants 'have been
guilty of gross nonfeasance and hostile discrimination in their arbitrary and capricious
refusal to process said claims' and 'have breached their duty and have discriminated
against the rights of the Plaintiffs, by violating the express and implied terms of the
collective bargaining agreement in effect by not representing the Plaintiffs fairly and
impartially in the Plaintiffs' loss of employment and the resulting loss of compensation
therefrom.' The prayer is for judgment in the sum of $160,000 against any or all of the
defendants.
O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674,677 (2d Cir. 1969).
56. Czosek, 397 U.S. at 26-27.
57. The suit was originally dismissed as to both.the union and the Railroad by John 0.
Henderson, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York.
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noted that the union could not be found liable for damages wholly or
partly attributable to the Railroad. 58 The court opined:
Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent of any
discriminatory conduct by the union and a subsequent discriminatory
refusal by the union to process grievances based on the discharge,
damages against the union for loss of employment are unrecoverable
except to the extent that its refusal to handle the grievances59 added to
the difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer.
In InternationalBrotherhoodof Electrical Workers v. Foust,60 the
Supreme Court held that unions could not be assessed punitive damages
for a breach of their duty of fair representation. 6 1That decision was partly
based on fear that punitive damages might deplete union treasuries so
severely that their effectiveness as bargaining agents would be jeopardized. 62 In reaching its decision, the Court commented on the frequently de
minimus nature of the Vaca court's apportionment rule: "[a]lthough
acknowledging that this apportionment rule might in some instances
effectively immunize unions from liability for a clear breach of duty, the
Court found considerations of deterrence insufficient to risk endangering
the financial stability of such institutions." 63 The concurring justices also
noted that ". . . the damages a union will be forced to pay in a typical
unfair representation suit are minimal; under Vaca's apportionment formula, the bulk of the award will be paid by the employer, the perpetrator
of the wrongful discharge, in a parallel §301 action." 64 Against this background of primary employer liability for wrongful discharge, Bowen v.
United States PostalService seems anomalous.
APPORTIONMENT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS

Two views concerning apportionment of damages in section 301
cases are supposed to have existed in the courts of appeals. The first,
which may best be labeled the Vaca approach, 65 does not hold the union
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed as to the dismissal of the suit
against the Railroad, but reversed and remanded as to the suit against the union. O'Mara v. Erie
Lackawanna R.R. 407 F.2d at 674, 679. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Czosek, 397 U.S. at 30.
58. Czosek, 397 U.S. at 29.
59. Id. at 29.
60. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
61. Id. at 52.
62. Id. at 50-51.
63. Id. at 50, citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 198.
64. Foust,442 U.S. at 57 (Blackmun, J., with whom Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and Stevens,
J.J. joined), citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 197-98.
65. The name is in reference to Justice White's majority opinion in Vaca v. Sipes. There is
some justification for referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Czosek v. O'Mara as a separate
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liable for lost earnings resulting from a wrongful discharge unless the
union participates in the discharge. The second, best labeled the Stewart
approach after Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight,66 holds the union liable for lost earnings which accrued
after the point when a grievance would theoretically have been settled
absent the union's breach of its duty of fair representation.
The Vaca Approach
The Vaca approach was first articulated in De Arroyo v. Sindicato
de TrabajadoresPacking.67 There, the court overturned ajury verdict that
the seven plaintiffs had been improperly discharged, and found instead
that the Telephone Company had improperly discharged six of the
seven. 68 In affirming the jury's verdict that the union had violated its duty
of fair representation with respect to six of the seven, 69 the court analyzed
the proper apportionment of damages:
We look again to Vica [sic] v. Sipes, this time for guidance on the
allocation of lost earnings where the Company improperly discharges
and the Union unfairly represents. Vaca establishes that only the
Company is liable for damages attributable solely to its breach of
contract, while the "increases if any in those damages caused by the
standard, but the Czosek gloss will be assumed to be part of the Vaca approach for the sake of
brevity of reference. See Note, A ProposalforApportioning Damagesin FairRepresentationSuits,
14 U. MICh.J.L. REF.497, 500-04. For criticism of whether the Vaca approach is actually mandated
by Vaca v. Sipes, see Comment, Apportionment of Damagesin DFRIContractSuits: Who Paysfor
the Union's Breach, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 155, 166 n.76.
66. 424 U.S. 554, 572-73 (1976). Justice Stewart's brief concurrence read as follows:
I agree with the Court that proof of breach of the Union's duty of fair representation
will remove the bar of finality from the arbitral decision that Anchor did not wrongfully
discharge the petitioners. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 194- Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335 348-5 1. But this is not to say that proof of breach of the Union's representation
duty would render Anchor potentially liable for backpay accruing between the time of the
'tainted' decision by the arbitration committee and a subsequent 'untainted' determination that the discharges were, after all, wrongful.
If an employer relies in good faith on a favorable arbitral decision, then his failure to
reinstate discharged employees cannot be anything but rightful, until there is a contrary
determination. Liability for the intervening wage loss must fall not on the employer but on
the Union. Such an appointment of damages is mandated by Vaca's holding that 'damages attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the
union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the union's refusal to process the
grievance should not be charged to the employer.' 386 U.S., at 197-98. To hold an
employer liable for back wages for the period during which he rightfully refuses to rehire
discharged employees would be to charge him with a contractual violation on the basis of
conduct precisely in accord with the dictates of the collective agreement.
Id..
67. 425 F.2d 281 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
68. Id. at 289.
69. Id. at 285.
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union's refusal to process the grievance should not be charged to the
employer." Vaca v. Sipes, supra386 U.S. at 197-198, 87 S.Ct. at 921;
see also Czosek v. O'Mara, supra, 397 U.S. at 29, 90 S.Ct. 770. In a

case such as ours, where there has been no suggestion that the Union
participated in the Company's improper discharge and where there

was no evidence that but for the Union's conduct the plaintiffs would
have been reinstated or reimbursed at an earlier date, we conclude

that the Union's conduct cannot be said to have increased or contributed to the damages attributable to the Company's improper discharge. Thus, the entire amount of lost earnings of each plaintiff.., is
properly charged to the Company.70

In Richardson v. Communication Workers of America,71 citing
De Arroyo, the Eighth Circuit also adopted the Vaca approach: where
the union's breach of duty involves only a failure to process an employee's
grievance, its apportioned damage arising from the unrelated wrongful
discharge is usually de minimus. Under such circumstances, the employer
is solely responsible for the damages flowing from the breach of contract.
However, under the above principles, where the union wrongfully induces
the discharge, it follows that its liability for damages may be apportioned
72
to the extent that it is responsible for the whole of such damage.
In Milsteadv. 1BT 73 and Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight74 the Sixth
Circuit found that unions could not be held liable for lost wages, 75 and
that employers could be held liable only for "lost wages and related
items. ' 76 The Vaca approach is similarly followed in Soto Segarra v.
78
Sea-LandService, Inc.77 and Wyatt v. Interstate& Ocean Transport Co.
70. Id. at 289-90.
71. 443 F.2d 974 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 818 (1971).
72. Id. at 981-82.
73. 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978).
74. 496 F.2d 276 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974).
75. It is also possible that the award rendered here included some damages for lost wages.
If so, the award is clearly contrary to law since judgment against the union under the facts
of this case can be had only for those damages that flowed from its own conduct.., and
which compensate Milstead 'from the Union's pocket for those expenses he incurred
because of the union's failure to process his grievance properly.'
Milstead,580 F.2d at 236-37 (quoting Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306,312 (6th Cir.
1975)).
76. Scott, 496 F.2d at 281-82.
77. 581 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1978). The court noted:
Consistent with Vaca, this court [has] held that where there is no allegation that the union
participated in the improper discharge or evidence that, but for the union's conduct, the
employee would have been reinstated earlier, no part of the backpay award is chargeable
to the union .... In the instant case, the district court did not charge the union for any of
the backpay due appellee but instead awarded $5,750 in attorney's fees proximately caused
by the union's failure to process his grievance.
Id. at 298, citing De Arroyo, 425 F.2d at 290, 292-93.
78. 623 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1980). The court concluded:
Under any view of the evidence, Wyatt's loss of wages was caused by his discharge. If it
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The strongest statements of the Vaca approach, however, are found in
80 In Milstead II
Milstead v. IBTI179 and Seymour v. Olin Corporation.
the Sixth Circuit noted:
Milstead contends that his damages were caused by the failure of the
Union properly to process his grievance, and not by his wrongful
discharge by his employer. He argues that the Union was responsible
for all his damages, including lost wages, stemming from his discharge.
This contention is flatly contrary to the law of this case... and is not
8
in accord with the law of this Circuit. '
The Fifth Circuit, in Seymour, also opined:
We see no reason why [the employer] should be relieved of the natural
consequences flowing from its wrongful discharge of [the employee],
merely because the Union defaulted in its separate duty to [the
employee] promptly to rectify [the employer's] wrong. The weakness
of [the employer's] position is revealed when it is expressed somewhat
more starkly: [The employer], the wrongdoer, protests to the Union:
you should be liable for all damages flowing from my wrong and after
a certain time, because you should have caught and rectified my
82
wrong by that time.
The Stewart Approach
The Stewart approach is more easily found in law review commentary than in Courts of Appeals decisions. 83 Of the four "apportionment"
cases cited by the majority in Bowen,8 4 three are dicta in Sixth Circuit
cases that are of dubious precedential value after Milstead85 and Milstead
1186 and one is dicta in a Seventh Circuit opinion in which even the
Stewart approach would have apportioned all backpay to the employer.
The first Sixth Circuit case, Smart v. Ellis Trucking Co.,87 remanded
in light of Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight8 8 an employee's appeal to the
was wrongful, he has an action against the employer and it is unfortunate if he has
foreclosed that by his dismissal of the employer at trial. Damages attributable to the
employer can be recovered only against it unless the union, by its actions, has contributed
to the wrongful discharge or exacerbated Wyatt's loss or diminution of wages, beyond that
for which the employer could be charged.
Id. at 892-93,
79. 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1982).
80. 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982).
81. Milstead II, 649 F.2d at 396.
82. Seymour, 666 F.2d at 214-15.
83. See Note, supranote 65, at 504-05; Comment, supranote 65, at 170-73; Feller, A General
Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CAL L. R'Ev. 663, 817-24 (1973).
84. Bowen, .... U.S. at...._, 103 S.Ct. at 593 n.8.
85. See supra note 73.
86. See supranote 79.
87. 580 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1978).
88. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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finality of an arbitration award. After reversing and remanding the portion of the district court decision overturned by Hines, the Court added
by footnote:
If on remand, the trial court determines that plaintiff is entitled to
reinstatement, it will be faced with the further question of the extent to
which the employer's liability for any backpay may be limited, should
it appear that the employer justifiably relied upon the finality of the
arbitration decision upholding the discharge and had no part in
undermining the process of arbitration. 89
In Ruzicka v. GeneralMotors Corporation%the Sixth Circuit, in
the process of remanding the case to the district court with instructions to
order arbitration, 9' rejected the assertion that the employer and the union
jointly and severally liable for the employee's injury.
When a breach of the duty of fair representation is shown, however,
the Union is liable for that portion of appellant's injury representing
"increases if any in those damages [chargeable to the employer] caused
by the union's refusal to process the grievance." Vaca 386 U.S. at
197-98, 87 S.Ct. at 921. Thus, upon a finding of unfair representation,
"the court must fashion an appropriate remedy," 386 U.S. at 187, 87
S.Ct. at 915, compensating Appellant from the Union's pocket for
those expenses he incurred because of the Union's failure to process
his grievance properly. 92
The Sixth Circuit noted in St. Clairv. Local 515 93 that "the union is
certainly liable for nothing more, and perhaps for less [than damages
measured by backpay]." 94 The court, however, went on to observe that
"the Supreme Court has strongly implied that in cases like this, involving
a discharge and an alleged failure by the union to take all available steps
to remedy the employee's complaint, the increment of damages caused by
95
the union's breach of duty is virtually de minimus."
In Harrisonv. ChryslerCorporation96 the Seventh Circuit remanded
for trial an employee suit asking backpay for the period between an
97
improper dismissal and reinstatement through the grievance procedure.
89. Id. at 219 n.6, citing Hines, 424 U.S. at 572-73 and Ruzicka, 523 F.2d at 312.
90. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975), reh'g denied, 528 F.2d 912 (1975).
91. Il at 315.
92. Id. at 312. Although the district court did apportion backpay to the union, 96 L.R.R.M.
2822, 2837 (E.D. Mich. 1977), this result does not seem to have been intended by the court. See
Milstead, 580 F.2d at 236-37, quoted supranote 74, where the court finds that damages for lost wages
cannot be apportioned to the union.
93. 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969).
94. Id, at 132 (footnote omitted).
95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977).
97. Id. at 1280.
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The court noted in its discussion of Chrysler's liability, "It is true that a
union which breaches its duty of fair representation may be sued by an
employee for lost pay attributable to the breach." 98 In Harrisonthe union
would, however, not be liable for backpay even under the Stewart
approach, since the backpay was for a period preceding the date of the
arbitration decision. 99
Given the paucity of support for the Stewart approach, the split
between the circuits may not be a true one.
Bowen IN BRIEF
On February 21, 1976 Charles V. Bowen was suspended without pay
by the United States Postal Service for his part in an altercation with a
fellow employee on postal service property.100 Bowen was formally terminated on March 30, 1976, and he appealed his dismissal through the
grievance procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement in
force between the Postal Service and his union, the American Postal
Workers Union, AFL-CIO.10' Bowen continued his appeal through the
steps of the grievance process until the union national office declined to
take his claim to arbitration. 02 He then filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia, charging that the
Postal Service dismissed him without just cause, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, 103 and that the union handled his grievance
perfunctorily, in violation of its duty of fair representation.104
98. Id. at 1279, citing Vaca, supra note 46.
99. See Comment, supra note 65, at 172 n.113.
100. Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 642 F.2d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1981).
101. Bowen, .U.S. at
, 103 Ct. at 590.
102. Id.
103. The action is allowed under the Postal Reorganization Act §1208(b) and (d):
Suits for violation of contracts between the Postal Service and a labor organization representing Postal Service employees, or between any such organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy.

39 U.S.C. §1208(b) (1976).
For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations in the district
courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor
organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal offices, or
(2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing
or acting for employee members.
39 U.S.C. §1208(d) (1976).
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit decision in Bowen, the Federal Tort Claims Procedure, 28
U.S.C. §§2671-2680 (1976), is not applicable to the Postal Service here since the Service's action is a
violation of a contract rather than a tort. See Bowen, 642 F.2d at 80 n.2.
104. The duty of fair representation arises under the National Labor Relations Act, subchapter
II of chapter 7 of title 29 of the United States Code. The duty is applicable to postal unions by reason
of §1209(a) of the Postal Reorganization Act: "Employee-management relations shall, to the extent
not inconsistent with provisions of this title, be subject to the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 7
of title 29." 39 U.S.C. § 1209 (1976).
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Chief Judge James C. Turk instructed the jury that, if they found

Bowen's claims meritorious, they should determine the proper compensatory damages and apportion these damages between the Service and the

union. Judge Turk indicated that the apportionment was left primarily to
the jury's discretion, but suggested that they might base their apportion-

ment on the date at which Bowen Would have returned to work if the
union had fulfilled its duty.105 Counsel for the union objected to apportionment of any backpay to the union, but failed to object to the manner
6
of apportionment suggested by Judge Turk. 10
The jury found for Bowen and awarded him $52,954 for lost wages
and benefits. The union was liable for $30,000; the remainder was to be
paid by the Postal Service. Punitive damages of $40,000 were also
awarded; $10,000 from the union and $30,000 from the Service,107 Judge

105. Bowen, .. U.S. at., 103 S.Ct. at 591. Although no authority for this theory of
apportionment is found in the district court decision, see Bowen, 470 F. Supp. 1127, the apportionment clearly follows the Stewart approach, discussed supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
106. Bowen, ._-U.S. at., 103 S.Ct. at 591. See particularly note 3:
Counsel for the Union stated, "Your Honor, in respect to this special verdict form,the
[Union] would object to any verdict or any question here which would allow the jury to
return ajudg[]ment against the [Union] for any 0 form of wages. Traditionally, the Union
does not pay wages. And these damages are wholly assessable to the [Service], if at all."
Record 611-612.
In a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, counsel for the Unioh
reasserted that the "amount of back wages awarded [Bowen] by the jury against the
[Union] is a matter of law wholly assess[able] against the employer." Record, Vol. 1,
Item 37, 2.
Id. at 103 S.Ct. at 591 n.3.
107. The completed special verdict form read:
SPECIAL VERDICT
I. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the defendant American
Postal Workers Union as bargaining agent for Lynchburg postal employes breached its duty
of fair representation to plaintiff Bowen in the handling of his grievance?
Yes
2.

3.

4.

Answer Yes or No
If your answer to Question I is yes, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff Bowen was discharged by defendant United States Postal Service without just
cause?
Yes
Answer Yes or No
Ifyour answer to Question I and/or 2 is yes, state from a preponderance of the evidence or
with reasonable certainty the amount of compensatory damages to which plaintiff is
entitled.
$47,000.00
If your answer to Question I is yes, do you find froni a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant American Postal Workers Union acted maliciously or recklessly, or in callous
disregard of the rights of plaintiff Charles V. Bowen in not taking Mr. Bowen's grievance to
arbitration?
Yes
Answer Yes or No
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Turk affirmed the verdict as to the union' 08 and adopted it as to the
Service. 09 He disallowed all punitive damages." 0
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit summarily reversed the
damage award against the union, holding as a matter of law that Bowen's
backpay was wholly chargeable to his employer."' The court, however,
refused to increase the $22,954 award against the Service to reflect damages originally allocated to the union. 112 That refusal obliterated over half
of Bowen's award, even though the amount itself was undisputed.
5. If your answer to Question 4 is yes, what amount, if any, do you assess in favor of plaintiff
Bowen against the defendant American Postal Workers Union as punitive damages?
$10,000.00
6. If your answer to Question 2 is yes, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant U.S. Postal Service acted maliciously or recklessly, or in callous disregard of the
rights of plaintiff Charles V. Bowen in terminating his employment?
Yes
Answer Yes or No
7. If your answer to Question 6 is yes, what amount, if any, do you assess in favor of plaintiff
Bowen against the defendant, U.S. Postal Service as punitive damages?
$30,000.00
8.

If compensatory damages are awarded by your answer to Question 3, state the amount, if
any, that should be attributable to the defendant Postal Service.
$30,000.00
Defendant Union
$17,000.00
Defendant
Postal Service
Date: December 20, 1978
/s/ Charlotte B. Ives
Foreman
Bowen, Petition for Certiorari, Appendix D at A21-A22.
108. Bowen, 470 F.Supp. at 1129-31.
109. The jury sat as an advisory panel on the claims against the Service under the authority of
28 U.S.C. §2402 (1976). Strangely, §2402 applies to suits brought under 28 U.S.C. §1346 (1976), while
this suit was (or should have been) brought under the authority of 39 U.S.C. §1208(b), the text of
which is reproduced supranote 102. Bowen, -U.S. at.., 103 S.Ct. at 600 n.2 (White, J., concurring). Thus, a nonadvisoryjury might have been proper. Cf.Baran v. Hoszwa, 62 F.R.D. 444 (N.D.
Ohio 1974).
110. Judge Turk reasoned:
Plaintiff is, under the normal principles applicable to this type of case, entitled to
recover punitive damages against the defendant USPS. That defendant has, however,
raised a plea of sovereign immunity to this aspect of the case, and the Court finds sovereign
immunity is a bar to recovery of punitive damages against the USPS. The Court, accordingly, sets aside the jury verdict to the extent that it awarded punitive damages to the
plaintiff against the United States Postal Service. Additionally, the Court finds that the
actions of the defendant APWU, while supporting the jury verdict and findings of compensatory damages, were less reprehensible than the actions of the USPS. Therefore, as
punitive damages cannot be assessed against the USPS, the Court does not deem it fair to
impose punitive damages against the APWU. Accordingly, the jury verdict, to the extent
that it awards plaintiff punitive damages against the defendant APWU, is set aside.
Bowen, 470 F.Supp. at 1131. The award of any punitive damages is now suspect under Foust, 442
U.S. at 52, which was decided eighteen days after the district court decision in Bowen.
I 1. Bowen, 642 F.2d at 82.
112. The court noted this refusal in a footnote added later which read: "We make no revision
in the judgement of $22,954.12 against the Postal Service. In this connection we note that no appeal
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The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and affirmed the
decision of the district court."l 3 The majority adopted the issue as petitioner Bowen did, 14 framing it as "whether a union may be held primarily
liable for that part of a wrongfully discharged employee's damages caused

by his union's breach of its duty of fair representation."" 15 First, the
majority examined the union's contention that it could, at most, be liable

116
only for Bowen's litigation expenses resulting from its breach of duty.

The majority found this argument flawed in that it treated the employer/
employee relationship created by the collective bargaining agreement as
was to be
though it were a simple contract of hire. Instead, the agreement
17
examined under "the federal common law of labor policy.""
The first element of that common law examined by the majority was
Vaca v. Sipes.lI8 They found that the Vaca principle for apportioning
damages was designed to make the employee whole. 119 Just as the
union's breach of its duty prevented the grievance procedure from functioning and justified allowing the employee's suit for damages, so the
union's breach of its duty "requir[ed] the union to bear some responsibil-

120
ity for increases in the employee's damages resulting from its breach."

The majority found the issue in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.

analogous in which proof of a breach of the duty of fair representation
was held to allow suit after an otherwise final arbitral decision. 121 Since it
would be unjust to bar an employee's recovery even when the union has

conspired against her, "[ilt would be equally unjust to require the
employer to bear the increase in the damages caused by the union's
wrongful conduct."'22
was entered by the plaintiff from the judgement against the Service in the amount of $22,954.12."
Bowen, 642 F.2d at 82 n.6. See Bowen,_..__U.S. at...... 103 S. Ct. at 592 n.7.
113. Bowen, ._U.S. at.., 103 S.Ct. at 599.
114. Brief for Appellant at i, Bowen, .. __U.S. at..__, 103 S.Ct. at 588 (1983).
115. Bowen, ._U.S. at., 103 S.Ct. at 590.
116. Id. at.., 103 S.Ct. at 593-94.
117. ld. at...._, 103 S.Ct. at 594.
118. See discussion supranotes 49-54 and accompanying text.
, 103 S.Ct. at 595.
119. Bowen, .... U.S. at
120. Id.
121. In Hines, employee wrongful discharge claims were submitted to arbitration, and were
denied by the arbitrator, after almost no investigation by the union. The District Court sustained
motions for summary judgment by both the union and the employer, for failure to show a breach of
the duty of fair representation and for finality of the arbitral decision, respectively. Hines, 72 Lab.
Cas. (CCH):13, 987 (N.D. Ohio 1973). The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the employer, but found a
sufficient showing of union breach to warrant remanding the complaint against the union for trial.
Hines, 506 F.2d 1153, 1156 (6th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court overturned the summary judgment
granted to the employer, despite the employer's apparent blamelessness in the grievance proceedings,
holding that the finality of an arbitration proceeding was not a bar where the union had breached its
duty of fair representation. Hines, 424 U.S. at 572.
122. Bowen, -U.S. at., 103 S.Ct. at 595 (footnote omitted).
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The majority also grounded the union's backpay liability in national
labor policy. Noting that the grievance procedure is fundamental to federal labor policy, the majority reasoned that the union's breach would
sabotage the procedure and unfairly injure the employer. 123 "Just as a
nonorganized employer may accept an employee's waiver of any challenge to his discharge as a final resolution of the matter, so should an
organized employer be able to rely on a comparable waiver by the
employee's exclusive representative." 124 Further, the Court reasoned,
imposing liability "will provide an additional incentive for the union to
process its members' claims where wanted."' '2
The majority distinguished Czosek v. O'Mara,126 noting that it was
decided under the Railway Labor Act.' 27 Although Czosek suggested the
union's liability for its breach should be limited to the employee's costs of
bringing suit in federal court,' 28 the majority noted that the RLA provided employees with an alternate administrative remedy not open to
Bowen. 129 Thus, the union's breach of duty was less damaging under the
130
RLA and a lesser standard of liability was appropriate.
The dissent took the position "that the employer should be primarily
liable for all backpay."' 131 Tracing the Supreme Court decisions preceding
Bowen, the dissent noted that an employee's right to bring a section 301
suit against her employer was first recognized in Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n.' 32 So long as the collective bargaining agreement contains no arbitration provision, "the employee's right to bring suit is unqualified, and
... the employer unquestionably is liable for any and all backpay that is
123. Id. at., 103 S.Ct. at 596-97.
124. Id. at , 103 S.Ct. at 597. It is interesting to note that this analogy to contract law
follows closely after the majority expressly disclaims "ordinary contract law" as a proper approach to
analyzing a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at.., 103 S.Ct. at 596.
125. Id. at..._, 103 S.Ct. at 597-98.
126. Czosek, 397 U.S. 25 (1970) is discussed supranotes 54-58 and accompanying text.
127. Bowen,
U.S.at...,103 S.Ct. at 599.
128. See supratext accompanying note 58.
129. The administrative remedy is described by footnote in Czosek:
Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §153 First (i), authorizes
reference to the Adjustment Board of disputes 'between an employee or group of
employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or
application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions ......
Section 3 First (j) of the Act, 45 U.S.C. §153 First (j), provides that fp]arties may be heard
either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives, as they may respectively elect....'
The individual employee's rights to participate in the processing of his grievances 'are
statutory rights, which he may exercise independently or authoize the union to exercise in
his behalf.'
Czosek, 397 U.S. at 28 n.l.
130. See Bowen, ._U.S. at_ , 103 S.Ct. at 599.
131. Bowen, ._-U.S. at , 103 S.Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting).
132. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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due." 133 If the agreement, however, contains an arbitration provision,
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox 34 requires that an employee exhaust the
grievance and arbitration provisions before commencing a Section 301
suit. 35 In Vaca v. Sipes,136 the Court excused exhaustion in cases where
the union alone could invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure
and the union had prevented the employee from exhaustion of remedies
by wrongfully refusing to process the grievance. 137 The dissent noted:
Vaca made clear that, with respect to an employer, the only consequence of a union's breach of a fair-representation duty to an
employee is that it provides the employee with the means of defeating
the employer's "defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual
remedies,". . . in a Section 301 suit. The Court explicitly stated that
the union's violation of its statutory duty in no way "exempt[ed] the
employer from contractual damages which he would otherwise have
had to pay,". .. and that the employer could not "hide behind the
138
union's wrongful failure to act."
The dissent's view of primary employer liability was further supported by Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,Inc.139 In Hines, the union's
breach of its duty of fair representation was held to lift the bar to an
employee's Section 301 suit, even though his grievance had been fully
arbitrated. 40 The Court rejected the employer's protest that its blameless
conduct should allow it to rely on the arbitral award.' 4' "As in Vaca, with
respect to the employer, the only consequence of the union's breach was
that it 'remove[d] the bar' to the employee's right to bring a Section 301
action."142
The dissent opined that holding the employer primarily responsible
for backpay awards did not absolve the union of liability for its breach.
Instead, "[t]he damages that an employee may recover upon proof that
his union has breached its duty to represent him fairly are simply of a
different nature than those recoverable from the employer." 43 Although
the dissent recognized that the union's liability would sometimes be de
minimis, they concluded that the Court had recognized and approved of

133. Bowen, -U.S. at
, 103 S.Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting).
134. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
135. Bowen, -U.S. at...__, 103 S.Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting).
136. 386 U.S. 171, discussed supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
137. Bowen, -U.S. at_...., 103 S.Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 600-01 (White, J., dissenting).
139. 424 U.S. 554 (1976), discussed supranote 121.
140. Id. at 567.
141. Id. at 569.
142. Bowen, -U.S. at_., 103 S.Ct. at 601 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 602 (White, J., dissenting).
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this fact in Electrical Workers v. Foust. 44 In that case, the Court shielded
unions from punitive damages in actions for breach of the duty of fair
representation. 145 "As in Vaca, considerations of deteffence were deemed
1 46
insufficient to risk endangering union 'financial stability."'
The dissent further argued that contrary to Vaca, the majority position left the union liable for the bulk of the employee's backpay award.
Without the employer's wrongful discharge and refusal to reinstate, the
plaintiff would have no right to reimbursement from anyone.. The dissent
thus reasoned that "there is no reason why the matter should not be
governed by the traditional rule of contract law that a breaching defendant must pay damages equivalent to the total harm suffered, 'even though
there were contributory factors other than his own conduct."' 1 47 The
dissent also disagreed with the notion that the union owed a duty to the
employer under the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement:
The agreement gives the union the right to raise grievances, but it does
not obligateit to do so. And, most assuredly, the ag-eement in no way
expressly or impliedly grants the employer any rights against the
union if the union fails to bring a meritorious grievance to its attention. (emphasis in original). 48
It is only the union's duty of fair representation which obliges it to
pursue employee grievances. This common law duty, the dissent asserted,
49
is owed exclusively to the employee.
The dissent did recognize that the union and the employer should be
jointly and severally liable where the union has participated in the
employer's breach,15 0 and suggested that the union should, in any case, be
secondarily liable.15' Neither conspiracy nor thd need for secondary liability, however, were implied by the facts in Bowen. Finally, the dissent, with
the exception of Justice Rehnquist,15 2 would have reversed the Fourth

144. 442 U.S. 42 (1979). See also text accompanying notes 60-64.
145. Foust, 442 U.S. at 52.
at...._, 103 S.Ct. at 602 (White, J., dissenting).
146. Bowen, .U.S.
147. Id. at...._, 103 S.Ct. at 603 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 5A CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §999 (1964)).
148. Bowen, -U.S. at , 103 S.Ct. at 604 (White, J., dissenting).
149. Id
150. Id. at___, 103 S.Ct. at 605 (White, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at
, 103 S.Ct. at 605-06 (White, J., dissenting).
152. Justice Rehnquist felt that, under the circumstances of Bowen, the judgments against the
Union and the Postal.Service were separate and their fate on appeal uncertain.
Prudent plaintiff's counsel would have filed a conditional cross-appeal, seeking to
increase the amount of that judgment if the Union were held not liable. This is because'an
appellee may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder
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Circuit opinion insofar as it protected the Postal Service from backpay
53
liability originally allocated to the union.
Bowen IN REVIEW
The errors of Bowen are of three types. The first is a fundamental
confusion of contractual and statutory duties as they apply in the context
of collective bargaining. 54 The second is a related misunderstanding of
the union's role in national labor policy vis-A-vis the employer. 55 The
third is a failure to appreciate the effects of the decision on the national
56
labor scene. 1
Confusion of Statutory and ContractualDuties
Statutory and contractual duties are easily confused in a Section 301
suit 57 where the employee has alleged a breach of the duty of fair representation by her union.1 58 Consider, for example, the fictitious case of
Marcy Fairweather (Fairweather), an employee of the Brown Cable
Company (Cable). Fairweather was a member' 59 of the United Wire

or of lessening the rights of his adversary, whether what he seeks is to correct an error or to
supplement the decree with respect to a matter not dealt with below.'
Bowen,_.U.S. at......_, 103 S.Ct. at 608 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. American
Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425,435 (1924)).
153. The dissenting opinion by Justice White noted that the failure to reallocate backpay
liability to the Service served twin vices: it failed to make the employee whole, Bowen, _.._U.S. at....._,
103 S.Ct at 607 (White, J., dissenting), and encouraged frivolous cross-appeals. Id. The majority
opinion was in agreement on this point:
The [circuit] court's view that the judgment against the Service could not be increased
because of Bowen's failure to appeal is erroneous. Bowen won an unambiguous victory in
the District Court. He established that he had been discharged by the employer without just
cause and that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation. The amount of lost
wages and benefits was not in dispute, and thejury and the District Court awarded him all
of his damages, apportioning them between the Union and the Service. Bowen had no
reason to be unhappy with the award and should not have been deprived of the full amount
of his compensatory damages because of his failure to cross appeal.
Id. at n.7, 103 S.Ct at 592 n.7.
154. See infra notes 157-206 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 215-28 and accompanying text.
157. A "Section 301 suit" is a suit brought by an employee under §301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185(a), which is reproduced supranote 42. Although §301(a)
speaks only of "suits for violation of contracts beween an employer and a labor organization ......
id, 29 U.S.C. §185(a), the Supreme Court established the right of individual employees to bring suit
under §301 for an employer's breach ofthe collective bargaining agreement in Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. at 200-01.
158. As previously noted, see supranotes 35-41 and accompanying text, a union's breach of
the duty of fair representation must be alleged in a §301 suit where the collective bargaining agreement contains grievance and arbitration provisions which are intended as the exclusive remedy for the
employer's breach ofthe agreement. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
159. It is not essential to the example that Fairweather be a member of the union, so long as
she is an employee in the bargaining unit represented by the union. The union's duty of fair represen-
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Twister's Union (UWTU), which represents the employees of Cable. 60
One bright July morning Elder Brown, the senile president of Cable,
mistook her name for that of Harvey Weathered-whom two shop
supervisors urged fired for excessive absenteeism 6 1-and ordered her
dismissed. 162 Fairweather's dismissal without just cause was in violation of
the collective bargaining agreement between Cable and UWTU, 63 and
her grievance was processed through the first four steps of the grievance
procedure' 64 without satisfactory resolution. 165 The fifth step of the grievance procedure, which involved binding arbitration, could be invoked
only with the approval of the national UWTU vice-president Sally
Venge. 166 Venge, who still bore a childhood grudge against Fairweather,
refused to have the meritorious grievance taken to arbitration. 167 Fairweather then filed suit in federal district court, alleging that Cable fired
her in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, 68 and that UWTU

breached its duty of fair representation by failing to take her meritorious
greivance to abritration. 69
Clearly, Fairweather's suit would be impossible without the wrongful actions of both Cable and UWTU,170 but the nature of their wrongful
tation is owed to all members of the bargaining unit, not just to union members. See Vaca, 386 U.S.
at 177.
160. UWTU was certified many years earlier by the National Labor Relations Board as the
exclusive bargaining representative for all nonprofessional and nonmanagerial employees of Cable.
161. Excessive absenteeism, def'med as three working weeks absence without excuse within one
year, was a valid ground for dismissal under the collective bargaining agreement in force between
UWTU and Cable.
162. The dismissal did not violate any state or federal statute, either by reason of Cable's
purposes or by reason of its procedure in dismissing Fairweather.
163. The collective bargaining agreement provided:
Any dismissal of an employee by error, without reason, or for a reason not expressly
provided by this agreement shall be without just cause and a breach of this agreement.
164. The collective bargaining agreement provided:
The grievance procedure detailed in this agreement shall be the exclusive method of
resolving disputes under this agreement, except as otherwise provided by law.
165. The resolution was not satisfactory to Fairweather. Since the resolution affirmed the
status quo, Cable was, of course, quite satisfied.
166. All prior steps involved only local or regional union officials. The decision to arbitrate was
made on the national level because the costs of arbitration were borne by the national treasury.
167. It is this action by Venge that constitutes a breach of the UWTU's duty of fair representation. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185.
168. A suit under LMRA §301 is interpreted by Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. at
200-01. See supranote 185.
169. Since the collective bargaining agreement sued upon has grievance and arbitration provisions intended as the exclusive remedy for Cable's breach, see supra note 164, the allegation of
UWTU's breach is a necessary component of Fairweather's §301 suit against Cable, see supra notes
35-41 and accompanying text.
170. It is an article of faith in §301 suits that, absent the union's breach in processing the
employee's grievance, the arbitrator would have reached the same decision on the merits of the
employee's claim as the court. See e.g., Bowen, .... U.S. at...._, 103 S.CL at 588 (1983), where the
inevitability of the arbitrator's decision is implicit in both the majority (TJhe union [must] bear
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actions is quite different. Cable violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between it and UWTU.17 1 Thus it committed a con-

tractual wrong which has injured Fairweather. By its nature, Cable's
breach is a continuing wrong; it can only be remedied by reinstating

Fairweather to her old job. 172 Cable's wrong is not, however, a violation
of national labor law: Section 301 simply allows the action to be brought
in a federal, rather than a state, court. 73 In contrast, UWTU's breach of its
174
duty of fair representation is a violation of the national labor policy.
UWTU has violated a duty owed to its member, Fairweather,175 and

UWTU's wrong is, by its nature, a single occurrence which the union
cannot later remedy. 176 It is not, however, a breach of the contract with
Cable, unless Cable has bargained for and received the right to rely on the

union's conduct. 177

some responsibility for increases in the employee's damages resultingfrom its breach. To hold
otherwise would make the employer alone liable for the consequences ofthe union's breach ofduty."
(emphasis added) Id. at-....._, 103 S. Ct. at 595) and dissent (commenting on Vaca, 386 U.S. at
173-76, "Had the union opted in favor of arbitration, an award almost certainly would have been
forthcoming long before thejudicialsuit had even proceededto trial." Bowen, .. U.S. at., 103
S.Ct. at 601 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added, footnote omitted). In light of the preceding
judicial article of faith, Fairweather's suit is "clearly" the result of actions by both UWTU and Cable.
Of course, Fairweather's suit would also be impossible without both breaches, see supranotes 35-41
and accompanying text.
171. See supranote 163.
172. Actually, Cable can mitigate only its continuing damages, but those continuing damages
cannot be mitigated by the union.
173. See the text of§301, reproduced supranote 42.
174. See supranotes 19-34 and accompanying text.
175. "It is now well established that, as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees in [the) bargaining unit, the Union had a statutory duty to represent all ofthose employees
.... " Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added). The duty of fair representation applies only to
relations between unions and members of the bargaining unit. This is in accord with the congressional
labor policy of protecting the establishment and operations of unions. See supranotes 14-17 and
accompanying text. This policy conflicts with the rights of individuals, and the courts have modified
the policy accordingly by recognizing the duty of fair representation. See Steele, 323 U.S. at 198-99;
see also supra note 27. No such fundamental right requires a further judicial intrusion into congressional policy of protecting unions, since it is precisely from employers that unions were protected.
176. The majority opinion in Bowen suggests, somewhat vaguely, that the union could mitigate to some extent: "The union would have the option, if it realized it had committed an arguable
breach of duty, to bring its default to the employer's attention. Our holding today would not prevent
ajury from taking such action into account." Bowen, -U.S. at.n.15, 103 S.Ct at 597 n.15. Even
taken at face value, this tenuous right is in no way comparable to the employer's ability to mitigate.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
177. One commentator has suggested:
[ihe only meaningful defense appears to lie in the bargaining process itself: the employer
should bargain for a broad indemnity clause, allowing the shifting of the cost of defending
seniority-only or union security aspects of a collective bargaining agreement to the party
ultimately responsible-the union. Such an approach relieves the court of the apportionment burden created by Vaca, and should serve as an effective check on the union's
ignoring the rights of its members.
Edwards, Employer Liabilityfor Union Unfair Representation:FidicuiaryDuty or BargainingReality?, 27 LAB. L.J. 686, 691-92.
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There is considerable authority analogizing the union's duty of fair
representation to the fiduciary duty of a trustee.178 Shorn of its labor law
context, Fairweather's suit is a relatively simple problem in the law of
trusts. UWTU serves as trustee for Fairweather, holding in trust Fair179
weather's valuable right to bargain with her employer for her services.
In its trustee positon, UWTU negotiates with Cable a contract providing
for Fairweather's services to be exchanged for compensation and certain
contract rights. Among these rights is a nonjudicial remedy for breach of
contract which must be invoked by the trustee.1 80 Upon breach of the
contract by Cable, 18 1 UWTU as trustee violated its fiduciary duty by not
pursuing the contractual remedy. 182 In an action against UWTU as trustee, Fairweather would be entitled to only the increases in damages
caused by UWTU's breach of its fiduciary duty. 183 Where, as here, the
party breaching the contract is available for suit on the contract and fully
able to pay damages, the trustee's share of damages would, at most, be
184
equal to the cost of bringing the suit.
The simple trust scenario is altered in national labor common law to
serve the policies which underlie national labor law. Thus, unlike an
ordinary trustor, Fairweather cannot bring suit on the contract until she
has exhausted the contract's grievance procedures, where these procedures are intended as the exclusive remedy for Cable's breach of contract. 85 The restriction on Fairweather's right to bring suit is intended to
encourage the efficient and peaceful resolution of disputes close to the
workplace, rather than in the costly and vexatious manner of a court
fight. 86 When the grievance procedures are unworkable, however, the
suit is not prohibited. 187 One such situation is where, as here, UWTU has
the exclusive right to invoke higher steps of the grievance procedure and
wrongfully refuses to do so. 188 The focus is upon the employee's right to
178. See Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions.
Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L. J. 391, 396-98 (1964);
Jones, supra note 27 at 27; Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191, 207
(4th Cir. 1963).
179. See 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (1976), quoted supra note 15.
180. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
182. See supranote 167 and accompanying text.
183. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRuSTS §§205(a), 282(2) (1959); G. BOGERT &
G. BOGERT.THE LAW OFTRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §869 (2d ed. 1982); 4 A. SCOTTTHE LAW OFTRUSTS

§282.1 (3d ed, 1967).
184. The situations are not totally analogous, in that the cost of bring suit is, typically, born by
the beneficiary regardless of who brings the suit, while the employee would not typically pay for the
grievance procedure. Thus the additional costs of bring suit may be nil for the beneficiary of a trust,
but substantial for a grieving employee.
185. Seesupra notes 35-41, 163.
186. Bowen, -..... U.S. at...._, 103 S.Ct. at 596.
187. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
188. Bowen, .-. _U.S. at_...., 103 S.Ct. at 594.
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recovery. 189 Restrictions are placed upon that right in order to further
dispute resolution at the plant level, but they are waived where they would
nullify the employee's right.
The Supreme Court has also altered the trust scenario by determining the correct statute of limitations for Section 301 suits. In DelCostellov.
InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters, 90 the Court held that the six-

month limitation on bringing unfair labor practice charges before the
National Labor Relations Board' 9 1 should also apply to the commencement of hybrid Section 301/duty of fair representation suits by
employees. 192 The DelCostello decision arose from the consolidation of
two lower court cases: DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,193 in which the Fourth Circuit affirmed the application of the

thirty-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards,
and Flowersv. Local 2602, UnitedSteelworkers of America, 194 where the
Second Circuit had applied the three-year statue of limitations for malpractice cases.
The Supreme Court in DelCostello noted that the hybrid Section

301/duty of fair representation suit "has no close analogy in ordinary
state law." 195 Although the Court had previoiuisly found state statutes of
limitation to vacate arbitration awards should apply to suits against
employers, 196 the Court found that the more appropriate state statute of
limitations was the period for legal malpractice. 197 The Court, however,
rejected the use of state statutes of limitations altogether, finding that the
employee's right to recovery was dependent upon both employer and
union being parties to the litigation. 198
189. Id. at_, 103 S.Ct. at 595.
190. _-.U.S. - 103 S.Ct. 2281 (1983).
191. N.L.R.A. §10(b), which reads in pertinent part: "Provided... no complaint shall issue
based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing ofthe charge
with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made
." National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(b) (1976).
192. DelCostello, .U.S.
at....._, 103 S.Ct. at 2293-94.
193. 524 F.Supp. 721 (D.Md. 1981), affd, 679 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982).
194. 671 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1982).
195. DelCostello, ._U.S. at_.._, 103 S.Ct. at 2291.
196. United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
197. Justice Stevens suggested an alternative solution for the claim against the union:
Borrowing the state limitations period for legal malpractice.... The analogy here is to a
lawyer who mishandles a commercial arbitration. Although the short limitations period for
vacating the arbitral award would protect the interest in finality of the opposing party to the
arbitration, the misrepresented party would retain his right to sue his lawyer for malpractice
under a longer limitations period. This solution is admittedly the closest state law analogy
for the claim against the union. Nevertheless, we think it too suffers from objections
peculiar to the realities of labor relations and litigation.
DelCostello, 103 S.Ct at 2292 (citation ommited, emphasis added).
198. The most serious objection is that it does not solve the problem caused by the
too-short time in which an employee could sue his employer under borrowed state law. In a
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Instead, the Court chose to borrow the six-month statute of limitations for bringing unfair labor practice charges, 199 reasoning that a Section 301/duty of fair representation suit very closely resembled an unfair

labor practice charge. 200 Thus, the Court reversed the judgment in Flowers, since ten months had elapsed before the suit was filed, and reversed
and remanded DelCostello for further proceedings. 201.
Beyond the restriction upon bringing suit, there is no labor policy
reason for altering the ordinary trust law scenario. The paramount policy
is that the employee be made whole; this is in no way frustrated by
making the employer primarily responsible for the employee's backpay,

particularly since the employer is typically the "deep pocket" party.202 Nor
is national labor policy furthered by allowing the employer to rely on the
union's breach.2 03 While the opportunity to reduce liability might make
an exclusive contract grievance procedure slightly more attractive to an
employer, the increased liability upon the union will make such a proce2 04
dure less attractive to union negotiators.
Thus, the character of Cable and UWTU's wrongs must carry
through to the apportionment of damages. Cable's primary, contractual,
continuing breach must result in primary liability for Fairweather's back-

pay. UWTU's unrelated statutory breach must result in secondary liability for Fairweather's backpay, 205 as well as liability for Fairweather's
additional damages. Typically, these additional damages will be the cost
206
of bringing suit in federal court.

commercial setting, a party who sued his lawyer for bungling an arbitration could ordinarily recover his entire damages, even if the statute of limitations foreclosed any recovery
against the opposing party to the arbitration. The same is not true in the §301 /fair representation setting, however.
Id.
199. See supra note 191.
200. Even if not all breaches of the duty [of fair representation] are unfair labor practices,
however, the family resemblance is undeniable, and indeed there is substantial overlap.
Many fair representation claims (the one in [DelCostello],for example) include allegations
of discrimination based on membership status or dissident views, which would be unfair
labor practices under §8(a)(1) or (2). Aside from these clear cases, duty-of-fair-representation
claims are allegations of unfair, arbitrary, or discriminatory treatment of workers by unions
-as are virtually all unfair labor practice charges made by workers against unions....
Similarly, it may be the case that alleged violations by an employer of a collective bargaining agreement will also amount to unfair labor practices.
DelCostello, ...- _U.S. at..., 103 S.Ct. at 2293-94 (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 103 S.Ct. at 2294-95.
202. The employer need not be the "deep pocket" party, however, since the union will continue
to have secondary liability for the employer's breach. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
203. See supranote 175.
204. Essentially, the union will be serving as a guarantor of the employer's good faith in
performance of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, whether or not it actually purchases
insurance to cover the risk, the union will absorb considerable additional costs.
205. Bowen,. U.S. at.
103 S.CT. at 605-06 (White, J., dissenting).
206. See. e.g., Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 1978); see
also supra note 77.
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The Union as Surety
The decision in Bowen has the additional fault of settifig up thl
union as a surety for the employer's wrongful act. Suppose, for example3
the fictitious Amalgamated Electrical Parts Supply, Inc. (PVtfts) discharged Harvey Smith, an employee, without just cause. Smith's digmissal constitutes a breach of the collective bargaining agreement 207 between
Parts and the United Part Sorters and Circuit Breakers Union (Union),208
If the collective bargaining agreement does not contain a grievance and
arbitration procedure which is intended as the exclusive remedy for Pats
breach, Parts is liable for all of Smith's backpay. 2 9 If, however, thd
contract does contain such an exclusive grievance and arbitration procedure, Bowen stands for the proposition that Parts may properly rely on
United to vigorouosly and completely pursue the Parts breach to a proper
remedy. Should Union fail to act to remedy the Parts breach, Union is
responsible for all backpay past the date when an arbitrator's decision
would have been rendered.2 10 In a typical ease, United will bear the
21
burden of the majority of Parts' backpay, '
Bowen's surety aspect removes from the bargaining process any
decision as to the duties of the union toward the employer under the
collective bargaining agreement, Rather than leaving these valuable contract rights to be freely negotiated, 212 Bowen forces a standard interpretation upon all such contract clauses. Yet this deviation from the norm of
freely bargained agreements is without foundation in labor policy. If
anything, the clear congressional policy of according protection to unions
21 3
should tip the balance in a close question in favor of the union.
Nor is the union's duty of fair representation a consideration in
determining the union's duty to the employer under an exclusive grievance and arbitration procedure. The union's duty of fair representation is
owed exclusively to persons in the bargaining unit it represents. 214 The
federal labor common law duty may incidentally benefit employers in
some instances, but its primary application, from Steele and Syres to the
present, has been to protect employees in the bargaining unit. Here,
however, the employee receives no benefit at all since the dispute merely
concerns who will pay her, rather than whether she will be paid.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

The contract language was substantially identical to that quoted supra note 163.
Smith was a member of the bargaining unit represented by United.
Bowen, -U.S. at....._, 103 S.Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at...-, 103 S.Ct. at 599 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. a,
103 S.Ct. at 601 n.4, 603 (White, J., dissenting).
See supranote 175.
Id
Bowen, -U.S. at.... 103 S.Ct. at 604 (White, J., dissenting).
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Bowen and "Labor Peace"
Bowen will also produce considerable and unfortunate negative
effects upon the national labor policy goal of labor peace. The first of
these effects is a severe reduction of the employer's incentives to settle a
Section 301 suit prior to trial. Consider, for example, the fictitious Harvey's Hammer Company (Hammer) which discharged Julie Forge in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement in force between Hammer
and the United Sisterhood of Tool Crafters (Crafters). Upon Crafters
breach of its duty of fair representation, Forge brought suit in federal
district court. Forge, an experienced and highly trained employee,
received twenty-five dollars an hour before her dismissal. Prior to Bowen,
Hammer would have had a two hundred dollar per day incentive to
correct its breach by reinstating Forge with backpay. 2 5 After Bowen,
however, Hammer's liability is borne by Crafters after the hypothetical
arbitration date,216 and Hammer's incentive to settle short of trial is considerably reduced. Crafters, of course, has considerably greater incentive
to settle early, but they are unable to provide the remedy of reinstatemeit
which is the crux of Forge's suit. By decreasing the likelihood of an early
settlement, Bowen increases both the expense and the contentiousness of
dispute settlement. That increase, of course, negatively effects the goal of
labor peace.
Bowen also increases the likelihood that a prudent union will take
nonmeritorious claims to arbitration to avoid the significant backpay
liability which an error in judgment could generate. 217 One can make a
convincing argument that the union will balance the probability and cost
of an unfavorable decision against the true costs of arbitration and
determine through a magical ten factor formula the correct and optimal
approach (to three decimal places). The union official, however, who
confronts a situation with no firm idea of the probabilities and no magical
formula is likely to understand the true message of Bowen: when in
doubt, fight it out. That incentive to arbitrate nonmeritorious claims will
tremendously increase the cost of employee appeals from dismissals, both
to the union and to the employer, and will reduce the likelihood of the
sort of quick, clear decision that best promotes labor peace.
The likelihood that unions will be forced to arbitrate unmeritorious
claims is increased by the present confusion over what amounts to a
breach of the duty of fair representation. The decision whether or not to
proceed with the final stages of the grievance procedure is a matter gener-

215.
216.
217.

Id. at..., 103 S.Ct. at 599 n.I (White, J., dissenting).
See supranotes 210 and 211.
Bowen, ___U.S. at___, 103 S.Ct. at 605 (White, J., dissenting).
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ally left to the discretion of the Union. 218 The problem arises when the
dismissed employee alleges that the union has refused "in an arbitrary or
perfunctory manner" 2 9 to pursue the matter further. Though there was
no challenge before.the Supreme Court of Charles V. Bowen's allegation
that his union had violated its statutory duty,22 0 there is no consistent
standard to determine when a union has done SO. 221 One commentator
has said that a conclusion of arbitrariness should be made by following
either a negligence or a rational decisionmaking standard. 222 A negligence

standard would hold a union liable for carelessness in complying with the
technicalities of the grievance procedure. 223 The negligence standard
would not hold a union liable where the union had consciously though
wrongly decided not to pursue a grievance. The rational decisionmaking
standard is meant to address this type of failing. 224 The problem with this

225
standard is that it may amount to second-guessing the union's decision.

It will be extremely difficult for a court to make a better decision than a
union regarding the merits of the grievance when it must also consider the
interests of other union members, the allocation of scarce union resources, and the effect that a decision to proceed will have on future collective
bargaining negotiations.2 26 It should be noted that the Court in Vaca felt
that an employee should not be able to compel arbitration of his grievance regardless of its merits lest the settlement machinery become overburdened and undermined.22 7 Perhaps this concern for the grievance process and the standard for defining "arbitrariness" in Vaca228 will temper
218. Vaea v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
219. Bowen, -U.S. at....._, 103 S.Ct. at 591.
220. Brief for Respondent Union at 2, Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service, .... U.S. at-..., 103 S.Ct.
at 588 (1983).
221. See VanderVelde, A Fair ProcessModel for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67
MINN. L. REV 1079, 1081-85 (1983); see also Lewis v. American Postal Workers Union, 561 F.Supp.
1141, 1147 (W.D.Va.1983).
222. Id. at 1098.
223. See, e.g., Baker v.Unit Parts Co., 487 F.Supp. 1313 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (a total failure to
file a timely grievance is sufficiently egregious to warrant liability); Ruggiero v. Ford Motor Co.,
411 F.Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (untimely filing due to uncertainty about merits); Local 692, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 209 N.L.R.B. 446, 85 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1974) (by itself, union's negligence in not
filing timely grievance is not arbitary conduct absent allegation showing something more).
224. See, e.g., Robesky v. Quantas Empire Airways, 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978) (there was
no rational basis for union's failure to tell employee that her grievance would not be taken to
arbitration; employee was harmed by rejecting settlement offer she otherwise would have taken).
225. Circuit Judge Murnaghan expressed his concern with the admission of evidence that
amounted to second-guessing the national union's assessment of the merits by someone without
experience at that level. Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service, 642 F.2d 79, 84 (4th Cir. 1981) (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
226. See generally VanderVelde, supranote 4.
227. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191-92.
228. Id. at 193-94. The union diligently supervised the grievance into the last step before
arbitration. When it appeared that arbitration would be fruitless, the union advised the grievant to
settle. It was not arbitrary for the union to decline further action.
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the harshness of Bowen by making it more difficult to prove a breach.
Bowen may even discourage unions from bargaining for arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining agreements because of the considerable
risk of liability such clauses entail.22 9 Yet Bowen provides, in return for
this considerable sabotage of national labor policy goals, no benefit at all
to the aggrieved employee. The injured party, after all, is concerned about
the amount of the award, not the pockets from which it is satisfied.
FOILING THE

Bowen TRAP

The best, and perhaps only possible, union defense against Bowen
type liability is to carefully document the reasons for not proceeding to
arbitration with a particular grievance. The documentation need not be a
massive, multi-paged treatise on the law as it concerns a particular discharge, but should reasonably set out the basis on which the claim was
denied. Consider, for example, the fictitious United Plastic Implement
Makers Union (Makers). Makers member Bob Baccus was dismissed by
his employer, Kitchen Tools, Inc. (Kitchen) for excessive drunkenness on
the job. Kitchen justified its dismissal of Baccus on a somewhat vague
provision of the collective bargaining agreement which provided for discharge under circumstances of "excessive self-induced-incapacitation" on
the job.230 Baccus appealed his dismissal within the contractual grievance
procedure through all steps prior to arbitration without obtaining a satisfactory resolution. On review of Baccus' request for arbitration Joseph
Jones, the Makers officer in charge of arbitration decisions, decided that
Baccus' grievance was unlikely to produce a favorable arbitral ruling.
Jones's decision was based on three grounds: (1) in three prior arbitration
decisions, Kitchen's interpretation of the "excessive self-incapacitation"
clause as applying to drunkenness had been upheld; (2) Baccus' frequent
drunkenness was undisputed; (3) Baccus' drunkenness on the morning of
his dismissal was witnessed by at least three knowledgeable persons willing to testify in Kitchen's behalf. A model form to document this decision
might read as follows:
United Plastic Implement Makers Union Arbitration Evaluation
Member name: Bob Baccus.
Disputed action: Dismissed for cause.
Reason for action: Kitchen claims that Bob showed up for work
intoxicated and that he had done so on six prior occasions
229. The argument may be made that the grievant would prefer that the money come from the
employer, rather than the union of which he is a member. The degree to which this will apply to a
person who feels mistreated by both parties is difficult to determine.
230. The contract provided: "An employee may be dismissed for excessive self-induced
incapacitation where an employee's non-coerced actions on or off thejob severely limit the employee's
job performance."
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during the year. Dismissal was for "excessive self-incapacitation" under the collective bargaining agreement.
Member's reason for grieving: Bob claims he wasn't drunk and that
Kitchen is "out to get" him.
Officer responsible for decision: Joseph Jones.
Date of Decision: January 20, 1984.
Decision: Arbritration not recommended.
Reasons: (1) Kitchen has been upheld in three similar arbitrations,
those of Jim Sort, Sally Thomkins, and Doug Johnson.
(2) Bob's earlier drunkenness is undisputed on the record
and Kitchen has witnesses.
(3) Bob's drunkenness on the morning of the dismissal was
witnessed by Mark George, William Mark, and Sharon
Fine, all of whom are willing to testify.
Such a form should be at least on file with the union, and should be
sent to the grieving member at the time the decision not to arbitrate is
made. 23' The form's purpose is to serve as evidence that the union's
decision was not arbitrary, malicious, or perfunctory. On the other hand,
it is intended to take very little time and effort to complete so that it does
not burden the official in charge excessively. Whether this or another
form is used, it is important that records showing clearly the union's
efforts to fulfill its duty of fair representation be kept. No such system can
avoid all liability, but care and accuracy in drafting such documents
should significantly improve the union's chances in court.
CONCLUSION

Bowen v. UnitedStates PostalService marks a significant change in
the Supreme Court's view of apportionment of damages in employee suits
under section 301 of the LMRA. The majority's decision will hold the
union liable, in a typical case, for more than half of the backpay caused
by the employer's wrongful dismissal. The decision represents, in part, a
confusion of the employer's contractual and the union's common law
duties to the employee and produces the bizarre result of holding the
union responsible for damages caused by the employer, such liability
being grounded on the union's duty to the employee. The union's new
surety position relative to the employer is likely to have unfavorable
effects upon the national labor policy goal of labor peace in that it will
reduce the employer's incentive to settle in a Section 301 suit, increase the

231. The possible rights of the employee with regard to such a form are beyond the scope of
this article. It appears that the union should inform the grievant of its decision so that he or she will
not lose an opportunity to settle short of arbitration. See supra note 224. Informing the grievant also
avoids the appearance of acting in an arbitrary or perfunctory manner.
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likelihood that unmeritorious claims will be brought to arbitration, and
reduce the likelihood of union approval of grievance and arbitration
procedures in collective bargaining agreements. In the end, the union's
only defensive weapon appears to be the careful keeping of records where
a decision not to arbitrate has been made.
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